One of the key challenges for implementing RFID systems in supply chain management is the difficulty in economic justification. Such difficulty is further amplified by its public participation nature as multiple self-interest beneficiaries may receive diverse paybacks, and their incentives to join the system are difficult to align. This paper aims to address these problems by a collaborative design from two aspects. First, we propose to introduce a centralized planning mechanism in the chain to facilitate the participation, so that the cost of the overall system can be minimized. Second, we propose to analyze the multi-facet economic return from multi-purpose applications to achieve the full potential of RFID systems. To illustrate our approach, its application for inventory inaccuracy and product recall in RFID system is presented.
Introduction
While Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology is expected to bring structural change to supply chain management, the challenges that are faced with RFID implementation are yet to be fully understood or effectively managed. One of the key challenges for implementing RFID is the lack of clarity of the economic returns (Dessureault 2006 , Lee & Özer 2006 . Moreover, in a public participation supply chain system, the economic justification issue can be further amplified by different standpoints, incentives and system evaluation methods of different parties involved in the system. On one hand, RFID creates unprecedented opportunity to enable increasing level of information sharing among various parties in the supply chain system, in order to accommodate the increasingly sophisticated system requirements. On the other hand, however, any opt-out party could significantly compromise the performance of the whole RFID system, as each party serves as both an information provider for neighboring parties and a control point for ensuring information quality. Therefore, RFID could potentially expose the business to amplified volatility if the incentive of each party towards its RFID adoption is not well aligned. It is important to ensure that each party is motivated with sufficient incentive, and at the same time, the total cost across different applications has to be minimized.
Researchers have tried to address this issue from different aspects. A stream of literature focuses on assessing RFID value in different areas, such as inventory inaccuracy, product recall, product authentication, etc. Another branch of the literature tries to assess the costs and benefits of RFID implementations that provide traceability to address product recall issues. Pouliot (2008) investigates the relationship between traceability, incentives for product recall and industry reputation. It quantifies the premium that customers are willing to pay for product recall improvement, which essentially is the value of traceability provided by RFID. Wang et al. (2009) optimize the traceability and production planning in a perishable food industry by integer programming. In particular, the model minimizes the production and recall liability costs by choosing proper production batch sizes and shipment schedules. Dai et al. (2012) specify how to design the system traceability by considering the system's economics and the explicit relationships between the choices of ID technology/coding level and supply chain performance.
However, most of the current literature does not take supply chain collaboration into consideration to maximize the total benefit, which limits the return generation. Moreover, they isolate the economic justification for different application areas, and do not consider the comprehensive return from multi-purpose supply chain systems. In this research, we try to close the gap via a collaborative design approach to achieve full potential of RFID systems from two aspects.
First, it is important to ensure that each party is motivated with sufficient incentive to join the RFID system, so that the economic return of the overall system can be maximized. By implementing this, one party can justify its RFID investment by leveraging from other parties through a centralized planning mechanism. The rationale is that the opt-out party may reduce the return of other parties, which may be significant enough for other
